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About the project 
Auctions for Renewable Energy Support: Effective use and efficient implementation options (AURES) 
This project helps assessing the applicability of different auction types to renewable support under different market 
conditions. It also explores which auction types and design specifications suit particular requirements and policy 
goals in European countries. By establishing best practices and a knowledge sharing network, we contribute to 
informed policy decision-making and to the success of auction implementations across Europe. 
Target-oriented analysis: Through analysis of empirical experiences, experiments and simulation, we will create a 
flexible policy support tool that supports policy makers in deciding on the applicability of auction types and certain 
design specifications for their specific situation. 
Capacity building activities: We undertake specific implementation cases to derive best practices and trigger 
knowledge sharing amongst Member States. We strive to create a strong network with workshops, webinars, 
bilateral meetings, newsletters, a website that will serve as capacity building platform for both policy makers and 
market participants (including project developers, auctioneers, etc.). Wherever required, we can set up specific 
bilateral and multilateral meetings on specific auction issues and facilitate cooperation and knowledge sharing. 
Additionally, we offer sparring on specific implementation options, drawing from insights gained during the first 
phases of the project (empirical analysis of previous auctions in Europe and the world), conceptual and theoretical 
analysis on the applicability of specific designs in certain market conditions and for certain policy goals issues and 
facilitate cooperation and knowledge sharing. Additionally, we offer sparring on specific implementation options, 
drawing from insights gained during the first phases of the project (empirical analysis of previous auctions in 
Europe and the world), conceptual and theoretical analysis on the applicability of specific designs in certain market 
conditions and for certain policy goals. 
Project consortium: eight renowned public institutions and private firms from five European countries and 
combines some of the leading energy policy experts in Europe, with an impressive track record of successful 
research and coordination projects. 
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This report deals with all past and ongoing auctions for renewable support in Denmark. 
Since 2004, five single-item, technology-specific offshore wind auctions were held, with 
one more currently ongoing. One multi-item, multi-site nearshore wind auction is currently 
ongoing.  
The report contributes to the first and second of three tasks in work package 4 of the 
AURES project: 
T4.1    Providing a characterisation of the different auctions 
T4.2    Making an assessment of auctions and case-specific lessons learnt 
T4.3    Interpreting and summarise the general lessons learnt and resulting and thereby 
outline specific recommendations 
 
For further information please contact: Lena Kitzing (lkit@dtu.dk) 
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1. Characteristics of auctions in Denmark  
Table 1. Characteristics of auctions in Denmark 
Characteristics Description 
Country characteristics 
Denmark has a population of 5.7 million and annual electricity 
consumption of 35 TWh (ca. 1% of EU-28). With peak load of around 6.6 
GW and interconnectors totalling 5.5 GW, it is well integrated in the 
European electricity system. Denmark is one of the leading countries in 
the world in terms of deployment of new renewable energies (non-
hydro). The focus on renewable energy in Denmark started after the oil 
crisis in the 1970s, leading to the now existing ambitious climate and 
energy policies. In 1985, the Danish parliament decided not to build any 
nuclear power plants. Instead the country is today among the world 
leaders in wind power technology. Wind power supplied 39% of the 
Danish electricity consumption in 2014, while in the same year 43.5% of 
total energy consumption was covered by renewable energy (including 
biomass). Among the ambitious energy targets are
1
: 
- Energy consumption covered 100% by renewable sources in 
2050 
- Power and heat supply covered 100% by renewable sources in 
2035 
- Coal totally phased out by 2030 
 
For the year 2020 the following targets can be expected to be achieved
1
: 
- 35% renewable energy in final energy consumption 
- 50% of electricity consumption covered by wind power 
Market characteristics 
The Danish electricity market can be characterised as a highly liberalised 
market. Denmark is part of Nordpool
2
, with two price zones (DK1 and 
DK2). Market concentration in DK2 is one of the highest in the Nordic 
region
3
. Overall, the two largest players own 50% of total installed 
capacity (Dong Energy 39% and Vattenfall 11%, in 2013).  
                                                     
1 https://stateofgreen.com/en/focus/on-the-path-to-a-sustainable-2050, 10.07.2015 
2 Nord Pool is a power exchange formed in 1993 
3 http://www.nordicenergyregulators.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Nordic-Market-Report-2014.pdf 
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Characteristics Description 
Several different instruments are used for the promotion of renewable 
energy, including feed-in tariffs, premiums, and tax incentives
4
. Today, 
fixed premiums and sliding premium tariffs are the major schemes for 
new installations.
5
 Auctions for renewable support are currently used for 
offshore and nearshore wind. 
 
Name of auction scheme 
Two auction schemes have been used so far: 
- "Udbud efter forhandling" (public auction with prequalification round) 
for offshore wind farms Horns Rev 2, the first try of Rødsand 2, 
Horns Rev 3 and nearshore areas: interested investors were pre-
selected by prequalification criteria in a first round and discussions 
and negotiations took place between this first round and the final 
bidding round  
- "Offentigt udbud" (pure public auction) for the second try of 
Rødsand 2 and offshore wind farm Anholt: No prequalification 
criteria was used with only one bidding round and no negotiations 
between investors and authorities 
Objectives 
The general objectives of the auctions were to efficiently achieve the 
ambitious renewable energy sources (RES) targets, by letting the market 
determine the exact level of support, and also to find the most suitable 
investor for the specific wind farm.  
An objective of the latest auction processes was also to establish a good 
balance between the interests of the investors and the public 
represented by the Danish Energy Agency.
6
 This is pursued by using a 
participatory approach. 
Contracting authority 
Danish Energy Agency (Energistyrelsen) 
Main features 
The offshore wind auctions are single-item, technology specific auctions 
for projects with predefined size and location. For the nearshore areas, a 
multi-site tender was introduced, with a maximum capacity of 350 MW 
distributed over 6 predefined areas.  
                                                     
4 Kitzing et al. (2012), Renewable energy policies in Europe: Converging or diverging?, Energy Policy 51, 192-201, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.08.064 
5 http://www.res-legal.eu/search-by-country/denmark/, 10.07.2015 
6 Analyse vedrørende fremme af konkurrence ved etablering af store havmølleparker I Danmark, Deloitte Report, April 2011 
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Characteristics Description 
All auctions are pay-as-bid auctions for sliding premium tariffs for a fixed 
amount of produced electricity (corresponding to approx. 12-15 years 
support duration).  
The first auction was a multi-criteria auction with a prequalification round. 
All subsequent auctions were single-criteria auctions. The 
prequalification round was temporarily abolished (for 2nd try of Rødsand 
2 and Anholt) but re-introduced in the later auctions (Horns Rev 3 and 
nearshore areas) including a participatory approach.
7
   
Year of introduction Since 2004, five auctions were held, with two more currently ongoing. 
Technology focus and 
differentiation 
Only technology specific auctions for offshore wind farms of a given 
installed capacity (except from the nearshore areas where the size is 
flexible up to a maximum limit) and placed on a pre-defined location. 
Lead time before auction 
 Horns Rev 2:  
First announcement to final bid: 8 months (Jul '04 – Feb '05) 
Announcement of auction conditions to final bid: 5 months (Oct '04 
– Feb '05) 
 
 Rødsand 2, 1
st
 try: 
First announcement to final bid: 18 months (Nov '04 – May '06) 
The project had to be retendered after the winning consortium 
withdrew from the contract.  
 
 Rødsand 2, 2
nd
 try: 
First announcement to final bid: 2 months (Feb '08 – Apr '08) 
Announcement of auction conditions to final bid: 2 months (Feb '08 
– Apr '08)
8
 
 
 Anholt:  
First announcement to final bid: 12 months (Apr '09 – Apr '10) 
Announcement of auction conditions to final bid: 12 months (Apr 
                                                     
7 Design features of support schemes for renewable electricity, ECOFYS Report, January 2014 
8 Note that the short lead time could only be realised because the auction was a simplified repetition from the previous one for the same wind farm.   
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Characteristics Description 
'09 – Apr '10) 
 
 Horns Rev 3: 
First announcement to final bid: 14 months (Dec '13 – Feb '15) 
Announcement of auction conditions to final bid: 9 months  (June 
'14 – Feb '15) 
 
 Nearshore areas: 
First announcement to final bid: expected 14 months (Feb '15 – 
Apr '16) 
Announcement of auction conditions to final bid: expected 11 
months (May '15 – Apr '16) 
 
 Kriegers Flak (upcoming) 
First announcement to final bid: expected 18 months (May '15 - 
Nov '16) 
Announcement of auction conditions to final bid: expected 13 
months (Oct '15 – Nov '16)  
 
The auctions are first announced in the Official Journal of the European 
Union. 
Min. / max. size of project Auctioned sizes were 200 MW (Horns Rev 2 and Rødsand 2), 390-400 
MW (Anholt) and 390-410 MW (Horns Rev 3), which had to be fully 
covered by one single bidder. In the nearshore areas, a total capacity of 
350 MW is auctioned which can be covered by multiple bidders. 
What is auctioned? 
Capacity with guaranteed tariff (sliding premium) paid for produced 
electricity during a predetermined amount of production. 
In detail, the following capacities were tendered with the respective 
awarded tariffs: 
 Horns Rev 2: 
200 MW capacity, support paid for 10 TWh production 
Contracted price: 51.8 øre / kWh (approx. €6.9 cent / kWh) 
 Rødsand 2 (1
st
 try): 
200 MW capacity, support paid for 10 TWh production 
Contracted price: 49.9 øre / kWh (approx. €6.7 cent / kWh) 
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Characteristics Description 
 Rødsand 2 (2
nd
 try): 
200 MW capacity, support paid for 10 TWh production 
Contracted price: 62.9 øre / kWh (approx. €8.5 cent / kWh) 
 Anholt: 
390-400 MW capacity, support paid for 20 TWh production 
Contracted price:105.1 øre / kWh (approx. €14.1 cent / kWh) 
 Horns Rev 3: 
390-410 MW capacity, support paid for 20 TWh production 
Contracted price:77.0 øre / kWh (approx. €10.3 cent  / kWh) 
 Nearshore areas: 
Total capacity up to 350 MW, support paid for 50,000 full-load hours 
of production 
 Kriegers Flak: 
600 MW capacity, support paid for presumably 30 TWh production 
 
The duration of support is for all wind farms contracted for a fixed 
amount of production that corresponds to 50,000 full load hours. With a 
potential of around 4,000 full load hours per year, the expected support 
period is 12-15 years. 
Budgetary expenditures per 
auction and per year 
There is no limit on the annual expenditures through the support 
scheme. Support payments are financed through a Public Service 
Obligation (PSO) charge on the electricity consumer bill. 
There has been no price cap on the offshore auctions. The ongoing 
auction for the nearshore areas has a price cap of 70 øre / kWh (approx. 
€9 cent / kWh) 
Frequency of auctions 
5 auctions were held until now: 
Feb. 2005: Horns Rev 2 
May 2006: Rødsand 2, 1
st
 try 
Apr. 2008: Rødsand 2, 2
nd
 try 
Apr. 2010: Anholt 
Feb. 2015: Horns Rev 3 
 
Two auctions are in progress: 
Apr. 2016: nearshore areas 
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Characteristics Description 
Nov. 2016: Kriegers Flak 
No fixed frequency of auctions can be determined. 
Volume of the tender 
2 x 200 MW offshore wind capacity (Horns Rev 2, Rødsand 2) 
1 x 390-400 MW offshore wind capacity (Anholt) 
1 x 390-410 MW offshore wind capacity (Horns Rev 3) 
1 x 350 MW offshore wind capacity in nearshore areas (6 predefined 
nearshore areas) 
1 x 600 MW offshore wind capacity (Kriegers Flak) 
Auction design elements See Table 2. 
 
Design elements for the assessment of auction schemes for RES-E 
Table 2. Design elements of auction schemes in Denmark 
Design elements  
Single- or multiple-
item auctions 
Single item auctions for large scale offshore wind farms where one tenderer has 
to provide the whole tendered capacity. In case of the nearshore areas, a 
multiple item auction is used where multiple bidders can be awarded up to the 
total auctioned capacity. 6 possible sites are predefined. Conditional bidding for 
two sites as well as mutually exclusive bids are allowed. 
Auction procedure Static sealed bid auctions were used in all cases. In the cases of Horns Rev 2, 
Horns Rev 3, the first try of Rødsand 2, the near shore areas and Kriegers Flak, 
there were two rounds with a “first indicative offer” and a “best and final offer”. 
Meetings were held after the indicative offer with the bidders individually. No 
information about the bid price of the competitors was published
9
. The 
negotiations were primarily held to determine the conditions for the final bidding 
round. The auction for Anholt and the second try of Rødsand 2 consisted only of 
one final bidding round. For the nearshore auctions and Kriegers Flak, a 
preliminary technical dialogue between potential bidders and the contracting 
                                                     
9 tender conditions for Horns Rev 3 Offshore Wind Farm of June 23, 2014 
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Design elements  
authority were held before the tender specifications were announced the first 
time
10
. 
Pricing rules 
Pay-as bid auction was used in all cases. Since most auctions are single item 
auctions there was no clearing price and the winner of the tender received its 
bid price. Also in the multiple item nearshore auction, there will be no uniform 
price, but pay-as bid for each awarded investor. 
Ceiling price Only in case of the nearshore wind farms a price cap of 70 øre/kWh is 
introduced. No ceiling prices were introduced to the large scale offshore 
windfarms. Nevertheless, all final support levels have to be ratified by the 
national parliament and included into the renewable support law. In case of 
Anholt, prior to ratification, the energy ministry issued a third party investigation 
(by Ernst & Young) of the winning bid price, who considered it as reasonable
11
. 
Qualification criteria A general prequalification criterion is that bidders must not have debt to public 
authorities exceeding DKK 100,000 (€13,417), which is standard for all public 
tenders in Denmark. For Anholt and the second try of Rødsand 2, no other 
criteria were specified. For the other auctions, the criteria are listed below: 
 Horns Rev 3
12
: 
- Letter of intent from a financial institution of demand guarantee 
of DKK 100 million (€ 13.4 million) 
- 1 reference of operation and maintenance of an offshore 
windfarm of more than 25 MW installed capacity 
- Up to 5 references of development and management of 
construction regarding offshore wind farms, at least one with a 
minimum size of 100 MW installed capacity 
- Minimum annual average turnover of DKK 15 billion (€2 billion) 
over the last 3 years available 
- Equity ratio
13
 of 20% or above OR long term debt rating of BBB- 
or above (Standard & Poor’s and Fitch) or Baa3 or above 
(Moody’s) 
                                                     
10 Sumary of technical dialogue connected to nearshore wind farms, Energistyrelsen Okt. 2014 
11 Klima – og Energiministeriet, Tredjepartsvurdering af Anholt Havvindmøllepark, june 2010 
12 Contract notice for Horns Rev 3 for the official journal of the European Union, December 2013 
13 Total equity/total assets x 100 
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Design elements  
- Suggestions for the negotiations taking part between the two 
bidding rounds 
- Social clause on apprenticeships, which ensures that a certain 
(individual) number of trainees is used in the construction of the 
wind farm 
- Specification of type of turbine and foundation likely to be used 
in the project 
In the case of Horns Rev 3 a maximum number of 10 applicants should be 
invited to the auction. If more applicants met the minimum requirements a 
reduction would have taken place on the basis of 
14
 
1. Most relevant references regarding project development and 
management of construction of offshore wind farms 
2. Most relevant use of systems as Environmental, quality and risk 
management systems 
Where more focus is put on the criteria under (1.) 
 Horns Rev 2: 
- Information about the financial situation and the technical 
experiences of the applying company: 
- Documentation of the balance and turnover of the last available 
year together with a declaration that the actual financial and 
technical capacity is not significantly lower compared to that. 
- Documentation of experience in wind energy projects including 
offshore wind-farms with information about size of the project, 
pictures, technical capacity, participating companies and 
experience in quality management. 
The exact selection criteria were not further expressed in advance, but the 
selection of prequalified bidders (maximum five) was based on the provided 
information above.
15
 
                                                     
14 Contract notice for Horns Rev 3 for the official journal of the European Union, December 2013 
15 Contract notice for Horns Rev 2 for the official journal of the European Union, July 2004 
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Design elements  
 Nearshore areas: 
- Up to 5 references of development and management of 
construction regarding offshore wind farms, at least one with a 
minimum size of 30 MW installed capacity commissioned in the 
past 5 years 
- Minimum annual turnover of 4 billion DKK as average over the 
last 3 years available. In case of a consortium of bidders, the 
sum of all participating companies is taken into account 
- Equity ratio
16
 of 20% or above OR long term debt rating of BBB- 
or above (Standard & Poor’s and Fitch) or Baa3 or above 
(Moody’s) 
Penalties For the first two auctions (Horns Rev 2 and Rødsand 2) no penalties were 
introduced. For the Anholt and Horns Rev 3, the following penalties were 
introduced, which had to be provided as bank guarantees until the conditions 
were fulfilled. 
 Anholt: 
In case of delayed grid connection of the first turbine, the following is 
deducted from the contracted guaranteed price for the whole support period: 
- delay of 1-3 months: 1 øre/kWh (approx. €0.13 cent / kWh) 
- delay of 4-8 months: 2 øre/kWh (approx. €0.26 cent / kWh) 
- delay of 9-12 month: 3 øre/kWh (approx. €0.39 cent / kWh) 
In case of delayed grid connection of the last turbine, i.e. if not all turbines 
are online until 31.12.2013, the following penalties apply: 
- DKK 100 million (€ 13.4 million) if delay is announced within 5 
months after entering the concession agreement  
- DKK 200 million (€26.8 million) if delay is announced within 12 
months after entering the concession agreement 
- Otherwise DKK 400 million (approx. €53.7 million) 
                                                     
16 Total equity/total assets x 100 
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Design elements  
This penalty functions also as a non-compliance penalty. The fine of DKK 400 
million (€53.7 million) amounts to approx. 2%of the total granted revenues (with 
the winning price of 105.1 øre / kWh or €14 cent / kWh). 
The grid connection was contracted to start on 31.12.2012, approx. 32 month 
after the final bid was placed (07.04.2010). The grid connection requirement 
was formally declared to be met when the first kWh of electricity is delivered 
from the offshore wind farm to the grid
17
. 
In the Anholt tender, a stand-by requirement was established, which obliged the 
second bidder to be stand-by for 6 month and overtake the project with the 
same time schedule at their own bid price in case the winner opts-out. 
 Horns Rev 3: 
In case of delayed construction work, i.e. if construction starts later 
than 01.01.2019, or if the concessionaire will not after all construct the 
electric power generating plant, the following penalties apply: 
- DKK 100 million  (€13.4 million) if delay announced within 4 
months after entering the concession agreement 
- Otherwise DKK 300 million (€40.5 million) 
In case of delayed grid connection, i.e. if less than 95% of the wind 
turbines are connected to the grid by 01.01.2020, the production eligible  
to support will be reduced by 0.2 TWh and again by 0.2 TWh for each 
subsequent 6 months the 95 % grid connection is not yet achieved
18
. 
Comparing Anholt and Horns Rev 3 taking the different wind farm sizes 
into account, we find that non-compliance penalty has been reduced by 
50%. At the same time the penalty for delayed performance was relaxed, 
because it falls in the end of the support period and not stretched over 
the whole period as before (since the support duration is cut in and not 
the support level). 
 Nearshore areas 
- Non-compliance penalty, i.e. when withdrawing from an awarded 
                                                     
17 Tender specifications for Anholt offshore wind farm, April 2009 
18 Tender specifications for Horns Rev 3 offshore wind farm, Appendix 1, part 5, December 2014 
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Design elements  
concession: 
- DKK 100 million (€13.4 million) per concession awarded 
- In case of delayed grid connection, i.e. if less than 95% of the wind 
turbines are connected to the grid by 01.01.2021, the following 
penalties apply:  
- The production eligible for support is reduced by 0.1 TWh, and 
further reduced by 0.1 TWh for each subsequent 6-month 
period where 95% grid connection is not achieved. 
 Kriegers Flak 
-  It is planned to use the same penalty scheme for delay as for Horns 
Rev 3. 
Monitoring of 
realisation progress 
A soft regulation approach is used, i.e. the concessionaire has to send plans of 
the project and the construction to the contracting authority. Afterwards there is 
no physical control how the plans are executed. Nevertheless, the grid operator 
(Energinet.dk) is monitoring the physical production of the wind farm, since it is 
responsible for the actual support payments, which are based on the measured 
production. 
Exceptions from 
requirements for 
small 
plants/developers? 
No exceptions from requirements were given. The participants in the offshore 
windfarm auctions were expectedly big companies. If a consortium of multiple 
smaller bidders wants to take part in the auction procedure, the prequalification 
criteria (if existing) have to be met for the sum of all companies involved. 
Support auctioned In all auctions three licenses concerning the conduction of preliminary studies, 
the construction of a power plant and the exploration of wind power for a certain 
total installed capacity were tendered. The award criterion was in all cases the 
price in øre per kWh produced electricity paid as a guaranteed fixed feed-in tariff 
until a certain amount of electricity is produced. The early tenders of Horns Rev 
2 and Rødsand 2(in the first try) had additional award criteria, such as the 
placement of the farm in a specified area and the time plan for construction.  
Transferability of 
support right 
The transferability of the support rights is until now not explicitly stated in the 
auction conditions. The law, in which the payments have to be integrated, does 
not explicitly state the receiver of the payments.
19
  
                                                     
19 https://www.retsinformation.dk/FOrms/R0710.aspx?id=167872#Kap5, §37 
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Design elements  
In the past, several changes in ownership have taken place after signing the 
concession: 
In 2013, E.ON Vind Sverige sold an 80% stake of Rødsand 2 to SEAS-NVE, 
retaining the remaining 20% stake. 
20
 
In 2011 (before the actual construction work began), DONG Energy sold a 20% 
stake of the Anholt wind farm to Pensionskassernes Administration A/S and a 
30% stake to PensionDenmark.  
The contracting authority (Danish Energy Agency) has to a priori approve 
ownership changes. Here, they differentiate depending on where in the process 
(of construction or operation) the wind farm is. The more time has passed since 
the auction, the easier an ownership change will be. It is expected that new 
owners must at least fulfil all pre-qualification criteria.  
For the most recent auction (Kriegers Flak), new information regarding the issue 
of transferability was published in June 2015
21
. This is a pro-active step by the 
Danish Energy Agency to enhance legal and economic investor security. It is 
envisaged that the transferability will be decided by the Danish Energy Agency 
on a case-by-case basis. In general, it will be possible to accept changes 
resulting from universal or partial succession into the position of the initial 
concessionaire, following corporate restructuring, including takeover, merger, 
acquisition or insolvency. Transfer of the contract to a 100% owned and 
controlled subsidiary is expected to be possible. All parties taking part in a 
possible transfer must at least fulfil the prequalification requirements for the 
tender. 
 
  
                                                     
20 http://www.eon.com/en/media/news/press-releases/2013/11/13/eon-sells-80-percent-share-of-rodsand-ii-offshore-wind-farm-to-seas-nve.html, 07.08.2015 
21 “Subsequent changes of a tenderer”, new offshore wind tenders in Denmark, Energistyrrelsen, 18.06.2015 
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2. Evaluation criteria for the assessment of auction 
schemes for RES-E 
From here onward, the auctions of the nearshore areas and Kriegers Flak are only partly taken into account 
since they are still in an early stage. 
Actor variety and social acceptability 
Mainly big, experienced energy companies were taking part in the auctions. This is partly due to the large 
scale nature of offshore wind projects, and partly due to the pre-qualification criteria requiring significant 
experience in the construction and operation of offshore wind farms. Nevertheless, the actors were mainly 
Danish, Swedish and in one case Dutch investors. Thus, a low level of international participation was 
achieved. In the first two auctions the auction material was only published in Danish, while in the following 
auctions the material was also available in English.  
In the nearshore auction, two of the three prequalified participants have not taken part in any of the previous 
offshore auctions in Denmark.  
As a measure to increase local support and social acceptability of the nearshore development, the 
concessionaires have to offer least 20% of the ownership shares of the nearshore wind farms to local citizens 
at cost price (option-to-purchase scheme, similar to onshore requirements). 
The following investors took part in the auction: 
 
Figure 1- actor variety in the different auctions 
 
Horns Rev 2 Rødsand  2 
(1) 
Rødsand 2 
(2) 
Anholt Horns Rev 3 Nearshore 
Areas 
Eurpean Energy 
Danish Kosortium 
Vattenfall Wind Power 
E.ON Europe 
Statoil 
Dong Energy 
E.ON Sverige 
Rødsand II 
Dutch Konsortium 
Kosortium E.on 
Konsortiet HR2 
Energi E2 
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 Horns Rev 2:  
- DONG Vind A/S (winner) 
- Elsam Kraft A/S 
- Energi E2 A/S 
- Konsortiet Horns Rev 2 (including 7 construction and investment companies, which are 
namely: Skovgaard Invest ApS, Petri Holding ApS, Dansk Vindenergi ApS, PMN Holding 
ApS, GK Gruppen ApS, Vindenergi ApS, samt Wind Investment ApS) 
 Rødsand 2, 1
st
 try: 
- Konsortium of E.ON Vind Sverige AB, Energi E2 A/S and DONG Vind A/S (winner) 
- Dutch consortium of Ballast Nedam Infra BV and velop BV 
- Rødsand II A/S (Vattenfall Wind Power A/S as main shareholder) 
 Rødsand 2, 2
nd
 try: 
- E.ON Vind Sverige AB (winner) 
- DONG Energy A/S 
 Anholt: 
- DONG Energy A/S (winner) 
 Horns Rev 3: 
- Statoil ASA 
- E.ON Wind Europe AB 
- Vattenfall Wind Power A/S (winner) 
- DONG Energy A/S 
 Nearshore areas: 
- wpd/HOFOR Danish Offshore Consortium (wpd AG and HOFOR A/S) 
- European Energy Nearshore Consortium (European Energy A/S and two international 
investors) 
- Vattenfall Vindkraft A/S 
 Kriegers Flak 
- 8 companies applied for pre-qualification 
Stakeholder dialogue in the Horns Rev 3 auction process 
In the auction process of Horns Rev 3 a strong focus was placed on stakeholder dialogue. Meetings with pre-
qualified bidders were reintroduced, after the lack of possibility for investors to discuss the auction conditions 
before submitting the final offer had been identified as a reason for the low participation in the Anholt auction 
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process 
22
.These meetings were described as very helpful for the overall process by the contracting authority 
as well as the interested investors. For that reason further details of the content and the organisational 
framework are described below. 
The following figure shows the timeline of the auction procedure for Horns Rev 3: 
Figure 2: Timeline of Horns Rev 3 Auction Procedure 
The meetings took place at the facilities of the Danish Energy Authority directly after the submission of the first 
and indicative offer of the prequalified investors. In relation to that, the potential investors were asked to 
prepare a document of maximum five pages stating seven suggestions for adjustment of the tender material 
which would help reducing the costs of construction and operation of the offshore wind farm and result in a 
lower final offer. In these, the estimated total impact of the suggestions on the final bidding price should be 
stated in øre/kWh.
23
 
However, the following elements were excluded from negotiation: 
• The location and area of the wind farm 
• The permitted size of the offshore wind farm (min 390 MW and max 410 MW). 
• Award criteria, including the method of settlement.  
• The completion date.  
• The penalty for non-compliance.  
• The decommissioning obligation - but not the guarantee in connection to this. 
 
After receipt of the first indicative offers and prior to the meetings, the Danish Energy Agency issued a memo 
with the subjects and questions to be negotiated. It was stated that at least one separate negotiation meeting 
                                                     
22 Analyse vedrørende fremme af konkurrence ved etablering af store havmølleparker I Danmark, Deloitte Report, April 2011 
23 Preliminary tender conditions for Horns Rev 3 Offshore Wind Farm, June 23, 2014 
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will be held with each potential investor and that all will be invited to the same amount of meetings with the 
same time allocated to each. However, the exact number of meetings as well as the minutes of the meetings 
or even the topics discussed was not published. The meetings were not public and treated confidentially. The 
participants received minutes from the meetings in which they have participated but not minutes from 
meetings with other potential investors.
22
 
After all meetings have been held the Danish Energy Agency decided to implement the following significant 
changes to the tender conditions
24
: 
 The time for submission of best and final offer was postponed by 14 days to the 16 February 2015.  
 A number of dates regarding information and deliveries from the concessionaire have been 
postponed by 1-3 months in order to provide more time for the concessionaire to comply with its 
obligations.  
 The period in which the bidders are obliged to uphold their offers has been reduced to 5 months.  
 The deadline for the legislative amendment has been shortened to 15 July 2015. 
 The buffer zone to be kept clear has been extended from 2/4 km to 4/6 km. Part of the extension is 
limited in time until 2032.  
 The cap for compensation in case of delayed grid connection has been increased from DKK 400 
million (€53.6 million) to DKK 800 million (€107.4 million).  
 The guarantee requirement for the decommissioning obligation has been reduced from DKK 600 
million (€80.5 million) to DKK 400 million (€53.6 million). It is at the same time emphasised that 
security requirements cannot be made until 12 years after connection to the grid of the first turbine. 
This, however, does not change the fact that the concessionaire is obliged to pay all costs of 
decommissioning the farm, irrespective of whether the costs are above or below this amount.  
 Preliminary studies may be undertaken by the concessionaire directly, so that the concessionaire 
does not have to await the end of the 4 week time period in which complaints against the concession 
decision may be brought up. Use of the license, however, is the responsibility of the concessionaire.  
 If investigations and removal of UXOs (unexploded bombs at the sea-bed) significantly exceed what 
should reasonably have been expected by the concessionaire on the basis of the preliminary studies 
carried out by Energinet.dk, a time extension may be applied for the construction of the offshore wind 
farm.  
Policy effectiveness (effectiveness of auctions) 
In the end, all auctioned Danish offshore wind projects have been realised at the contracted sizes. However, 
the first auction of Rødsand 2 did not lead to realisation - the winning consortium suggested renegotiation of 
the support price and finally withdrew from the contract, so the auction had to be repeated. Looking into 
delays, we find that in the first two auctions (Horns Rev 2 and Rødsand 2) the schedule for the construction of 
                                                     
24 Final tender conditions for Horns Rev 3 Offshore Wind Farm, December 2014 
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the farm was part of the bidding offer and not previously determined by the contracting authority. The 
contracted and actual realisation dates were: 
 Horns Rev 2: scheduled for 31.12.2009
25
, realized on 17.09.2009 
 Rødsand 2: scheduled for 01.01.2010
26
 (in the 1
st
 try) and for 30.09.2011
27
 after the re-
tender, realized on 15.08.2010 
For Anholt and Horns Rev 3 the realization date was scheduled by the contracting authority and delay 
penalties were introduced. The contracted and actual realisation dates were: 
 Anholt: scheduled for 31.12.2013
28
, realized on 19.06.2013 
 Horns Rev 3: scheduled for 31.12.2020
29
 
In the case of Rødsand 2 a project delay of 20 month assuming the first scheduled realization date occurred, 
due to the withdrawal of the first winning consortium from the contract. They justified their withdrawal with 
heavily increased prices for turbines by the (at that time) only two suppliers of large offshore turbines (Vestas 
and Siemens)
30
. In this case, it can be discussed if underbidding took place, also considering the fact that the 
winning party of the re-tender was E.ON Sverige, who also was part of the winning consortium in the first 
auction. 
Static efficiency or cost effectiveness (including transaction and administrative costs) 
As the auctions were specifically undertaken for offshore wind, they did not have the objective to select the 
lowest cost option per unit of renewable energy production possible (offshore wind is still approx. twice as 
expensive as e.g. onshore wind). The auctions should, however, ensure that the projects are realised at least 
costs. Total generation costs can in this respect be minimised by two elements: 1) ensuring that the investor 
with the least cost (the best efficiency, highest synergies, etc.) realises the project; 2) avoid unnecessary 
increases of private transaction cost or administrative costs. 
In the Anholt tender, only one bidder participated in the auction. Here, it is questionable that the auction 
helped identifying the least-cost supplier. In an analysis of the Anholt auction process, Deloitte
31
 identified the 
main reasons for investors not taking part in the auction as: 1) the high penalties connected to delays 
combined with a tight schedule; 2) the possibility of participating in offshore auctions on financially more 
attractive markets at the same time, especially in UK. Furthermore a clear policy for future Danish wind farms 
was lacking and so synergy effects to possible later projects were difficult to estimate. Overall, the inflexible 
design of the auction without the possibility of negotiations and proposals made the participation unattractive. 
                                                     
25 Tilladelse til etablering af elproduktionsanlæg samt internt ledningsnet Horns Rev 2, Energistyrelsen March 2007 
26 http://ing.dk/artikel/ingen-vil-bygge-dansk-havmollepark-84309, ingeniøren 21.12.2007, looked up at: 12.07.2015 
27 Tilladelse til etablering af elproduktionsanlæg Rødsand 2 med internt ledningsnet, Energistyrelsen May 2008 
28 Tender specifications for Anholt offshore wind farm, April 2009 
29 tender conditions for Horns Rev 3 Offshore Wind Farm of June 23, 2014 
30 http://ing.dk/artikel/molle-fiasko-fordobler-danskernes-regning-gron-strom-84319, ingeniøren 21.12.2007, looked up at: 12.07.2015 
31 Analyse vedrørende fremme af konkurrence ved etablering af store havmølleparker I Danmark, Deloitte Report, April 2011 
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Regarding private transaction cost, while in the first two auctions (Rødsand 2 and Horns Rev 2) all preliminary 
studies and impact assessments had to be undertaken by the market players, these costs are now in their 
entirety minimised in the sense that e.g. environmental impact assessments are undertaken before the 
auction and thus do not have to be repeated several times by different actors. Also, the national TSO is 
responsible for grid connection from an offshore substation to land, and thus bidders are relieved of that 
burden. 
There has been made no estimation about the transaction and planning costs related to the realisation of the 
auctions yet. Roughly 1.5 – 3 person years (full-time equivalent) were required for the preparation and 
realisation of the auctions for Horns Rev 3 and Kriegers Flak.  
The bidders do not have to pay a certain fee in order to compensate the contracting authority for their 
expenses.  
Furthermore, there has been no special training or education of staff before the auction processes. Several 
types of consultants have been used for technical, economical and legal questions (as Deloitte or Ernst & 
Young). ). A budget of DKK 12 million (€1.6 million) to be used between 2012 and 2015 was dedicated to 
preparation and marketing of the Danish auction implementation in the political agreement from 2012 
(energiaftale)
32
, which was used for consultants and the (international) marketing of the auctions. 
Dynamic efficiency 
Since all auctions have been technology specific auctions for offshore wind farms, they support the 
development of offshore wind technology, with respective cost decreases to be expected. The described 
auctions increased the total installed wind capacity in Denmark from 455.2 MW before the auctions to 
currently 1271.5 MW, and 1671.5 MW including the already contracted Horns Rev 3.  
When taking the required support level as a proxy for the technology cost, we see that it has an increasing 
trend over the time from 51.8 øre / kWh or €7 cent / kWh ( (Horns Rev 2, 2005 prices) to 77 øre / kWh or €10 
cent / kWh (Horns Rev 3, 2015 prices) as can be seen in the following graph (prices are adjusted for 
inflation
33
): 
                                                     
32 "Aftale om den danske energipolitik 2012-2020", march 2012 : http://www.ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/files/politik/dansk-klima-energipolitik/politiske-aftaler-paa-
energiomraadet/energiaftalen-22-marts-2012/Aftale_22-03-2012_FINAL_ren.doc.pdf 
33 Yearly inflation rates by consumer price index of Danmarks Statistic  
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The high price in the Anholt auction has been justified (in the third party investigation of Ernst & Young
34
) by 
the increased costs of wind turbines and installation equipment (especially construction ships). This was 
mainly caused by supply bottlenecks caused by many simultaneous offshore wind projects in other European 
countries
19
.  
Such distortional external effects should be taken into account when evaluating the long-term impact 
technology cost.  
Furthermore, the overall cost of offshore wind farms are very much depending on locational and 
environmental factors. Major driving factors include distance to shore and water depth. An overview of these 
is shown in the following table. 
wind farm distance 
from 
center to 
shore [km] 
depth range                   
from [m]          to [m] 
Horns Rev 2 32.6 9 17 
Rødsand 2 9.0 6 12 
Anholt 22.6 12 19 
Horns Rev 3 29.6 11 20 
 
Distance to shore and water depths do not seem to be the major reason for price increases. However, it can 
be seen that for example the higher price for Horns Rev 3 compared to Rødsand 2 can be partly caused by 
higher depth and longer distance to shore. 
Additionally, the support levels are not a perfect proxy for technology costs, as they also depend on electricity 
market price forecasts, which play an important role for the time after the support period (12-14 years from 
start of operation). Here, we can see that forecasts had previously included much higher price expectations 
than in the years during and after the crisis. 
                                                     
34 Tredjepartsvurdering af Anholt Havvindmøllepark, Klima – og Energiministeriet june 2010 
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Compatibility with market principles and integration 
All auctioned wind farms receive sliding premium tariffs as support scheme. Therefore, the operators have to 
participate actively on the spot market and are well integrated in the liberalised electricity market.  
The sliding premium is paid out as the difference between the guaranteed price and the spot price and 
calculated specifically for each hour, using actual hourly based measured production of each wind farm 
individually as reference production. Forecast risks and balancing costs thus apply for the offshore wind farm 
operator in the same way as for 'normal' market participants. Participation of the operator on the balancing 
market does not affect the support payments. 
The sliding feed in premium is designed as a firm cap, leaving no market price upside to the operators. In 
case the spot price is higher than the guaranteed price, no support payments are paid out and additionally, 
the gained upside is used to offsets the support payments in the following accounting period.  
For the last two auctions (Anholt and Horns Rev 3), production is not eligible for support payments whenever 
negative spot prices occur. This measure minimises the adverse incentive of producing in spite of negative 
prices that premiums usually give and incentivises the operator to shut down wind production in periods where 
production is larger than demand. 
Distributional effects & minimisation of support costs 
Regarding minimisation of support costs, Denmark has technology-specific targets, so the minimisation is not 
regarded across all technologies, but rather per wind park development. Here, the pay-as-bid pricing in the 
auctions should in principle lead to lower support costs per plant than e.g. a less flexible feed-in tariff where 
support levels are determined by law. This then leads in terms of distributional effects to relatively higher 
consumer surplus in relation to producer surplus, meaning that windfall profits for producers are minimised. 
We find that the first two auctions (Horns Rev 2 and Rødsand 2) led to a support level of 51.8 øre / kWh (€6.9 
cent / kWh) and 62.9 øre/kWh (€8.5 cent / kWh) respectively. This is arguably a low level compared to other 
European offshore wind farms in UK or Germany. 
The Anholt auction with 105.1 øre / kWh (€14.1 cent / kWh) led arguably to a high support costs, for the 
reasons explained above. 
Horns Rev 3 resulted in a support level 77 øre/kWh (€10.3 cent /kWh), which has been deemed a successful 
minimisation of support cost for an offshore wind park in the Danish discussions
35
. 
Overall, the support of renewable energy in Denmark makes today approx. 10% of a typical household 
electricity bill
36
, which is relatively low in a European comparison considering the large share of renewables in 
the Danish system. In 2014, the support for offshore wind (mainly determined from the auctions) made 53% of 
                                                     
35 see e.g. http://www.4coffshore.com/windfarms/horns-rev-3-winner---vattenfall-@-%800.1031-per-kwh-nid1402.html  
36 Kitzing, L. (2014), "Risk Implications of Energy Policy Instruments", PhD Thesis, Technical University of Denmark, http://orbit.dtu.dk/en/publications/risk-implications-of-
energy-policy-instruments%288d770b85-a75c-45c3-9a2e-e5740b0b907e%29.html  
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the total support payments. This dominance is expected to increase to approximately 70% after Horns 3 and 
Kriegers Flak are implemented
27
. Auction design is thus a highly significant factor for the minimisation of 
support costs in Denmark. 
3. Lessons learnt: key best practices and pitfalls 
identified  
 High penalties and inflexible auction design can lead to low participation and high bidding prices. 
 Open dialogue between investors and contracting authorities can lead to improved results. 
 Penalty design can be improved taking investor considerations into account: A penalty scheme that 
reduces the duration of support and not the support level is seen as a relief by investors, as it e.g. 
puts them in a better position towards loan-giving banks.  
 In the timing of the auction, simultaneousness with other international auctions should be avoided. 
 An early clarification of transferability options regarding the support concession increases investor 
security. They should be best already stated in the tender descriptions.  
 
